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Summary
Most scholars are inclined to assume that the diplomatic practices of the European Union’s member states 
remain fundamentally unchanged. Th e EU’s Council of Ministers is accordingly seen as a setting where 
sovereign states speak with one another. Yet if state interaction in the EU is only viewed from this perspec-
tive, a number of important qualitative changes will remain underexposed. Th is article argues that leading 
political forces in the European states have come to view their nations as anchored so deeply within the 
supranational institutions of the EU that their diplomats merge the promotion of national interests with 
those of the Union. In this late sovereign phase of diplomacy, political and legal authorities overlap, 
territorial exclusivity is replaced with functional boundaries, and states begin to speak with one voice. 
Th e article explores three interlinked aspects of late sovereign diplomacy: the teleological interpretation of 
the EC and EU treaties; the intense socialization of state representatives; and the negotiation process, 
which promotes national positions as part of a European cause, thereby delocalizing the national interest. 
While the EU has not rendered national diplomacy obsolete, it has profoundly changed its meaning and 
consequences.
Keywords
late sovereign diplomacy, European Union, national interest, doxa, socialization, legitimacy, constitu-
tional pluralism
Introduction
A few decades ago, the institution of diplomacy in international society was per-
ceived as being in decay and decline. Th e feelings of trust and shared responsibility 
for peace and orderly relations were disappearing. According to Hedley Bull, the 
cohesion of the global diplomatic system was disappearing:
*) An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association’s Annual Con-
vention, New York, in February 2009. I would like to thank the two editors of this special issue, Brian 
Hocking and Jozef Bátora, for their very constructive and insightful comments, which have substantially 
beneﬁ tted the argument. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable and helpful 
suggestions. I extend my special thanks to Chris Bickerton for his critical questions and inspirational 
ideas, and am also indebted to Rune Saugmann Andersen, Jens Bartelson, Benjamin de Carvalho, Ulrik 
Pram Gad, Martin Hall, Lene Hansen, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Morten Kelstrup, Noel Parker, Anders 
Wivel, Trine Villumsen and Ole Wæver for their valuable comments.
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Th e solidarity of the diplomatic profession has declined since the mid-nineteenth century when 
diplomatists of diﬀ erent countries were united by a common aristocratic culture, and often by ties 
of blood and marriage, when the number of states were fewer and all the signiﬁ cant ones European, 
and when diplomacy took place against the background of ‘the international of monarchs’ and the 
intimate acquaintance of leading ﬁ gures through the habit of congregating at spas.1
Th is article argues that the diagnosis of an erosion of solidarity among diplomats 
was misguided — at least when it comes to the European Union. European inte-
gration has given rise to a re-emergence of feelings of solidarity among national 
representatives, which scholars described as lost 30 years ago. In the EU, the 
member states are united, if not by blood and marriage, then by what I call a ‘late 
sovereign diplomacy’ growing out of day-to-day negotiations in the Council of 
Ministers and its working groups. Late sovereign diplomacy is characterized by 
the intense legal, institutional and social integration of national representatives 
adhering to the sweeping notion of ‘an ever closer union’ and producing legisla-
tion that challenges the sovereignty of their own nations. A selected group of 
national representatives has come to share a collective identity that may be even 
stronger than that which could be found among aristocrats in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In this late sovereign order, the production of national and European 
interests is merging.
Th e ﬁ rst part of the article argues that EU scholars — be they from the liberal 
inter-governmentalist or multi-level governance camp — tend to understand the 
respective relationships among the member states along the lines of traditional 
diplomatic theory. From this perspective, it is diﬃ  cult to explain the negotiation 
processes in the Council and their supranational traits. Th e article then proceeds 
to suggest that diplomacy within the EU should instead be understood from 
the perspective of what Neil Walker terms a ‘late sovereign order’. Late sover-
eignty is a term used to describe the evolutionary process in Europe whereby legal 
and political authority has shifted away from the state to non-state polities — 
particularly since the end of the Second World War.2
Th e third part of the article explores three interlinked aspects of late sovereign 
diplomacy in greater depth. Late sovereign diplomacy is characterized by a teleo-
logical interpretation of the EC and EU treaties, intense socialization between 
state representatives, and a negotiation process that promotes national interests as 
a contribution to the European project, thereby delocalizing the national interest. 
National representatives in Europe continue to perform many of the same tasks 
as they have done for centuries, such as writing aide-mémoires and organizing 
1) Hedley Bull, Th e Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977), p. 328.
2) Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition 
(Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2003).
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oﬃ  cial state visits.3 Nonetheless, a late sovereign order leads to a qualitatively dif-
ferent form of state representation.
If traditional diplomacy is dialogue between states, diplomacy in the late sov-
ereign phase can be regarded as a cacophony of diﬀ erent voices from states and 
non-state polities. In the late sovereign order, states are trying to speak with one 
voice and may even attempt to suppress their own voice. Will this eventually lead 
to the end of national diplomacy as we (think we) know it? Th e closing part of the 
article suggests that the ambiguous and contested nature of European integration 
has helped to transform diplomacy, but a genuine revolution or destruction of 
inter-state diplomacy in the EU is likely to remain a distant dream.
In the following, diplomats are understood to be oﬃ  cials who represent their 
member states in EU decision-making (whether formally employed in the diplo-
matic services or as members of the national civil services). Th e deﬁ ning feature 
of diplomacy is thus the performance of oﬃ  cial national representation. As will 
be clear, however, ‘national representation’ in a late sovereign order is diﬀ erent 
from what traditional diplomatic theory would want to be.
Inside the Council of Ministers
Th is section looks brieﬂ y at the understanding of the national representative in 
two major approaches to the EU — liberal inter-governmentalism and multi-
level governance — and argues that the role of the diplomat is interpreted in a 
surprisingly conventional way. Th is calls for an alternative approach to diplomacy 
in the EU.
Following a liberal inter-governmentalist approach, regional integration is based 
upon situations in which the government aggregates the preferences of domestic 
groups into a consistent preference before carrying out international negotia-
tions.4 At ﬁ rst glance, the liberal inter-governmentalist approach understands 
the EU in terms of a two-level game metaphor.5 According to this image, diplo-
macy always proceeds on two diﬀ erent levels at the same time: the international 
and domestic levels. Hence, during international negotiations, each national 
leader — or diplomat — must strike acceptable deals with his or her international 
partners and must ratify such deals in the respective domestic constituencies. Th e 
3) See also Brian Hocking, ‘Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners: Th inking about Foreign 
Ministries in the European Union’, in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds), Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union: Integrating Diplomats (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 9.
4) Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Politics: A Th eoretical Introduction’, in 
Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds), Double-Edged Diplomacy: Interactive Games in 
International Aﬀ airs (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1993).
5) Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: Th e Logic of Two-Level Games’, International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427-460.
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statesman and his or her negotiators are constrained in their international nego-
tiations by the interests of their constituents and what is acceptable to the other 
statesmen and negotiators. Th is reﬂ ects traditional understandings of inter-state 
bargaining. Th us, the liberal inter-governmental approach reproduces an image 
of member state relations in which the inside and outside of the state are clearly 
demarcated by diplomacy, or as Moravcsik puts it: ‘Th e two-level games meta-
phor views the relationship between domestic and international politics through 
the eyes of the statesman’.6 In this view, diplomacy constitutes the state as a 
state — a separate entity that acts and has national interests that are distinct and 
separate from those of other states. Diplomats are seen as mediators between 
disparate — and not necessarily directly connected — worlds.7
But how can this image of negotiation be upheld in the context of a European 
polity with supranational elements? Moravcsik adds a third level to his theory of 
liberal inter-governmentalism to understand the EU. Th e ﬁ rst two levels are sim-
ilar to Putnam’s two-level game, while the third employs elements that are drawn 
from regime theory. Supranational institutions tend to make cooperation more 
likely for many reasons, including the reduction of negotiation transaction costs. 
Once the procedure for negotiations in the EU has been decided, it becomes 
unnecessary to decide on them again. Th is renders all subsequent negotiations 
easier and less costly than the ﬁ rst negotiation.
Nonetheless, the liberal inter-governmentalist approach tends to assume a 
Westphalian and one-dimensional conﬁ guration of legal authority. Constitu-
tional law is reserved for the internal order of the state, whereas international law 
governs relations between sovereign states.8 Th e fundamental principle guiding 
diplomacy is that the territorial sovereignty of states does not extend beyond their 
borders; each state exercises exclusive authority over its own territory. Th is means 
that the only claims to authority worth taking into account in the international 
order are those of the states. Indeed, this is why diplomacy can be deﬁ ned as states 
speaking with each other.9
To many observers of the EU, however, liberal inter-governmentalism has not 
suﬃ  ciently helped us to understand the radical nature of European integration. 
Multi-level governance approaches are usually seen as the main challengers of 
state-centred interpretations of the EU and, one should think, also the traditional 
6) Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Politics’, p. 23.
7) Iver B. Neumann, ‘“A Speech that the Entire Ministry may Stand For”, or: Why Diplomats Never 
Produce Anything New’, International Political Sociology, vol. 1, no. 2, 2007, pp. 183-200.
8) Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, p. 9.
9) Even if this has not always been a true and fair picture, it is the prevailing understanding of how diplo-
macy has functioned since the Peace of Wesphalia in 1648. From the perspective of international law, 
it can hardly be denied that 1648 marked an epoch in its evolution, not least by establishing the principles 
of political self-determination, non-intervention and legal equality between states. See Leo Gross, ‘Th e 
Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, Th e American Journal of International Law, vol. 42, no. 1, 1948, 
pp. 20-41.
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vision of diplomacy. Th eories of multi-level governance and Europeanization 
have successfully contested the previously dominant inter-governmental research 
agenda.10 In the multi-level governance approach, the state is but one of many 
actors in a multi-dimensional order with increasing specialization and socializa-
tion of national representatives. Accordingly, a national representative, who is 
bargaining on behalf of a state, need no longer be employed by a foreign oﬃ  ce or 
foreign ministry, but may instead represent any national ministry or department 
that regularly engages in the Council system. Th e EU is not seen as an ordinary 
multilateral setting, but rather as a partly supranational setting in which actors 
such as the European Commission and the European Parliament are part of the 
negotiation process.11 Moreover, multi-level governance approaches assume that 
the sovereignty of the European state has been eroded and that informal policy 
networks have developed.
Nevertheless, multi-level governance scholars usually assume that national rep-
resentatives defend particular national interests and speak solely for their states.12 
Th e Council apparatus — consisting of the Council of Ministers, the Union 
presidency and the COREPER (Comité des Représentants Permanents) and its 
working groups — is seen as responsible for defending separate national prefer-
ences. Th e assumption is that the territorial principle predominates in the Coun-
cil, while the functional or ‘European’ principle prevails in the supranational 
institutions.13 Th e functional principle entails that the supranational institutions, 
which are formally independent of the member states, are responsible for policy 
initiation and promoting the common European interest. Somewhat strikingly, 
while recognizing the complex character of decision-making in the EU — also in 
multi-level governance approaches — the Council is seen as representing national 
interests and traditional diplomatic bargaining. Although multi-level governance 
scholars have pinpointed the changes in the governance structure of the Union 
with its supranational elements, informal contacts between public and private 
actors and technocratization, they have generally refrained from exploring iden-
tity formation processes within the Council system.14
10) Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric 
Versus Multi-Level Governance’ Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, 1996, pp. 341-378. 
See also Tanja E. Aalberts, ‘Th e Future of Sovereignty in Multi-Level Governance Europe: A Constructiv-
ist Reading’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 1, 2004, pp. 23-46.
11) See Jozef Bátora, ‘Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, p. 56.
12) Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal, ‘An Organization Th eory Perspective on Multi-Level Governance 
in the EU: Th e Case of the EEA as a Form of Aﬃ  liation’, ARENA Working Paper, no. 97/21 (Oslo: 
ARENA, 1997).
13) Brigid Laﬀ an, ‘Th e Social Psychology of Identity Change’, in Richard K. Herrmann, Th omas Risse 
and Marilynn B. Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Lanham MD: 
Rowman & Littleﬁ eld, 2004), p. 84.
14) See Simon Hix, ‘Th e Study of the European Union II: Th e “New Governance” Agenda and Its Rival’, 
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To be sure, for governments and their administrations, the EU continues to 
represent a clearly diﬀ erent level of negotiations, which is demarcated from the 
domestic. British representatives still have to go to Brussels for Council working 
group meetings and they do not come empty-handed (or -headed), but bring 
instructions from London about speciﬁ c goals and interests that they are expected 
to defend in these meetings. So while the supranational institutions are powerful, 
most scholars are inclined to assume that the member states’ diplomatic practices 
remain fundamentally unchanged. Indeed, Council negotiations can be said to 
uphold the sovereign order in Europe. Yet if state interaction in the EU is only 
viewed from this perspective, a number of important qualitative changes will 
remain underexposed.
Th e Late Sovereign Setting
Today, any standard textbook on foreign policy analysis will emphasize that diplo-
macy has been transformed since 1945, and in particular since the end of the 
Cold War. But is diplomacy also qualitatively diﬀ erent in the EU compared to 
diplomacy in other multilateral venues such as the United Nations?
Without delving too deeply into the discussion of what the EU is, there are 
aspects that make it a unique setting. Ruggie has inﬂ uentially argued that the 
conduct of politics among EU members resembles the medieval form of rule with 
its ‘overlapping forms of authority’ and ‘non-exclusive forms of territoriality’.15 To 
understand what this may imply, Neil Walker’s notion of late sovereignty is help-
ful in capturing the immense legal and political transformations in Europe, par-
ticularly since the end of the Second World War. It should be stressed that the 
crude distinction between two diﬀ erent phases of sovereignty in Europe are ideal-
type characterizations rather than all-embracing categories. Accepting this, one 
can describe the Westphalian phase as characterized by territorially separated 
states in a one-dimensional conﬁ guration of political and legal authority, whereas 
the late sovereign order has rival representational practices of states and non-state 
polities with overlapping legal and political authority and competences. Late sov-
ereignty displays considerable continuity with the old order, yet has distinctive 
features. Indeed, this combination of continuity and change is what renders ‘late’ 
sovereign diplomacy ‘late’ rather than ‘post’.
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 38-65; and Marks, Hooghe and Blank, ‘Euro-
pean Integration from the 1980s’, pp. 270-271.
15) John Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, Inter-
national Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, 1993, pp. 139-174. Th e debate can be linked back to Bull, Th e 
Anarchical Society, pp. 254-255. For a detailed account of ‘neo-medievalism’ and its relevance for contem-
porary international relations, see Jörg Friedrich, ‘Th e Meaning of New Medievalism’, European Journal 
of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp. 475-501.
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In the age of late sovereignty, European states continue to claim territorial 
authority, but non-state polities also make claims to authority, often an authority 
that is bounded by function. Boundaries are no longer just territorial; they have 
also become functional.16 Hence, the EU eﬀ ectively claims authority over policy 
sectors such as international trade, agricultural and monetary policy. It is no lon-
ger the minsters of trade from each member state, but the Trade Commissioner 
who represents and binds the member states collectively in the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO). EU member states have no individual representation. Th e 
development of such functionally limited claims to competence does not mean 
that the territorial integrity of the state is threatened, but it opens up for a new 
conception of authority relations with numerous boundary disputes in a pluralist 
constitutional order.
As a consequence of these successful claims to authority, the EU itself has 
become a diplomatic actor with a full-blown external representation when it 
comes to trade and development aid, for instance, and a European Foreign Ser-
vice is on its way.17 Th e Union increasingly acts diplomatically on the world scene 
in parallel with national diplomats.18 EU member states have maintained their 
own embassies abroad, but EU citizens are also represented by the European 
Commission representations if they come to Ghana, Bolivia or China. What 
emerges is an image of diplomacy in which it is not just states speaking with 
states, but states speaking with non-state actors — or even non-state actors speak-
ing on behalf of member states on the international scene.
As ultimate legal and political authority is exercised in a functional and not just 
a territorial logic, foreign ministries lose their monopoly to represent their nations 
in Brussels and other international organizations. Today, ministries of agriculture, 
trade, defence and ﬁ nance send their own representatives to Council negotia-
tions, often without much control and oversight from the foreign ministries. 
Accordingly, a diplomat need no longer be employed by a foreign oﬃ  ce or foreign 
ministry, but may represent any national ministry or department with regular 
engagements in the Council system. In this sense, the EU is contributing to the 
disintegration of state authorities and the loss of power of foreign ministries.19
Th e following sections of this article discuss three interlinked aspects of late 
sovereign diplomacy that oﬀ er insights into exactly what may be changing 
and where old ideas and practices continue: the teleological interpretation of the 
16) Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, p. 23.
17) Michael Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a State: Th e External Delegations of the European Commission’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, 1999, pp. 183-205.
18) Simon W. Duke, ‘Preparing for European Diplomacy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, 
no. 5, 2002, pp. 849-870.
19) David Spence ‘Th e Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union Aﬀ airs’, 
in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds), Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats 
(New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 33.
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EC and EU treaties; the socialization of national representatives; and the delocal-
ization of the national interest.
Towards an Ever Closer Union
A ﬁ rst feature of late diplomacy is the teleological interpretation of the EC and EU 
treaties that bind the member states and provide their negotiations with the pur-
pose of overcoming their national diﬀ erences.20 Th e fundamental aim of Euro-
pean integration is captured in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, which states 
that the gathering nations of Europe are ‘determined to lay the foundations of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Th us, when the states became 
EU members, ‘they also implicitly signed up for more integration, because — in 
EC rhetoric — law (and obedience to law) has traditionally meant integration’.21
What makes the European Union unique compared to other international or 
regional forums for diplomacy is the solidness of its basic legal framework within 
the ﬁ rst pillar of the EC treaty, which consists of true public law and not merely 
recommendations or the expressions of intentions that are typical of international 
public law. No other international organization has hitherto proven as demand-
ing as the EU when it comes to the political obligations and legal constraints that 
it places on its member states. Th e treaties establish a new form of relationship 
between the state and the EU polity, and member states are obliged to accept the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) doctrine of the supremacy of EC law over 
national law, or in the words of the ECJ in the infamous Costa v. ENEL:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having [...] powers stemming from a limitation of 
sovereignty, or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited ﬁ elds, and thus have created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.22
Th e treaties and ECJ case law glue the EU member states together in an unprec-
edented fashion: all EU member states’ national legal systems must deal with 
the ECJ’s claim to supremacy over national law. Nevertheless, as Karen Alter 
has stated, ‘Th e ECJ can say whatever it wants, the real question is why anyone 
should heed it’.23 True enough, the ECJ may make it increasingly diﬃ  cult for EU 
member states to act as they please, but this does not mean that they stop being 
sovereign or no longer defend their national interests. However, law is not only 
20) Jo Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, 1996, p. 231-255.
21) Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis?’, p. 237.
22) Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585, 593.
23) Karen J. Alter, ‘Th e European Court’s Political Power’, West European Politics, vol. 19, no. 3, 1996, 
p. 458.
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regulative of behaviour; it may also play a constitutive role in the formation of actors’ 
identities and interests and in the structure of the international system itself.24 
Th is insight is often ignored in studies of diplomatic interaction in the EU.
Th e idea of ‘an ever closer union’ serves to legitimize the EU’s actions to its own 
civil servants, including the national representatives based in Brussels. It is part of 
their self-perception about what they are doing and constitutes part of their own 
identity. Of course, such ideas are only transformed into political ideology when 
they are able to mobilize society or social forces. Until then, they merely remain 
a set of ideas shared by a sociologically limited group of people — in this case, a 
few thousand bureaucrats and national representatives who meet in Brussels.
Even if this self-legitimation has not become a genuine ideology, it does con-
tribute to making diplomacy in Brussels a radical phenomenon. In their negotia-
tions, EU member state representatives work in a particular direction, more or 
less consciously sharing the common goal of fulﬁ lling the aims of the treaties. 
Th ey work within what Bourdieu would call a doxa, which ‘operates as if it were 
the objective truth across social space in its entirety’.25 Th is doxa of European 
integration covers the tacit assumptions that are fundamental to the European 
project. Doxa is the undiscussed premise that makes negotiations in the EU 
meaningful in the ﬁ rst place and upon which agents act. Indeed, the idea that 
Europe must continue to move forwards is a shared assumption that is very rarely 
questioned by any national representative. Th ey may not always agree on where 
the EU should be moving or how fast, but it should move forwards.
One of the most important ways in which the EU moves forwards is through 
law. In the Council, diplomats translate the abstract notions of ‘an ever closer 
union’ into negotiations on secondary legislation in the form of regulations and 
directives. In other words, national representatives produce more than just deci-
sions; they create new legislation in cooperation with the supranational institu-
tions, legislation that may have direct and immediate eﬀ ect in their member 
states.
When in Brussels . . .
Linked to the doxa of ‘an ever closer union’ is deep socialization, which is a second 
feature of late sovereignty. Social interaction between nation-state representatives 
is much more intensive in the EU than anywhere else in the world, which increases 
the possibility of transfer of loyalties.26 From this perspective, the neo-functionalist 
24) Jo Shaw and Antje Wiener, ‘Th e Paradox of the European Polity’, in Maria Green Cowles and Mike 
Smith (eds), State of the European Union 5: Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000).
25) Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
26) Socialization can be understood as a process of inducting agents into the norms and rules of a given 
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legacy might seem relevant to the study of diplomacy in the EU. Neo-functionalists 
such as Lindberg stressed that elite socialization was a key to understanding Euro-
pean integration; in the Council, problem-solving is dominant and ‘the normal 
practice is to exclude the possibility of not reaching an agreement at all’.27 How-
ever, neo-functionalism failed to link the negotiation processes in the Council 
with the teleological interpretation of the treaties and the doxa of ‘an ever closer 
union’, thereby ignoring a crucial aspect of state interaction in Europe.
Th e EU is a formal international organization, established by states through 
international legal rules, but these legal rules in turn aﬀ ect the identities of the 
representatives of its member states. In short, the politico-administrative elites in 
the EU member states have been undergoing a ‘Europeanization of national iden-
tity’.28 Over the years, since the foundation of formal European institutions, 
‘leading political forces [. . .] have increasingly come to view their nations as 
anchored within European institutions and to recognize the EU as a legitimate 
framework for politics’.29 
Th is merging of the national and European interests in the EU goes uncon-
tested in most cases. It has helped the member states work together peacefully 
on very advanced projects of regional cooperation that demand a high degree of 
mutual trust. Without intense contacts, there would be no integration in sensitive 
issues such as monetary policy, common defence and criminal law.30 Identiﬁ ca-
tion with the European project can increase in tandem with continued identiﬁ ca-
tion with the nation-state. If this dual-identity structure works well, national and 
European identiﬁ cation can be mutually reinforcing.31
Th e fact that national representatives assume the role of bureaucrats participat-
ing in the construction of a non-state polity does not entail that they agree on the 
type of polity. Th ere are divergences over, for example, which kind of asylum 
policy should be followed, how much sovereignty the state is willing to give up or 
how the member states’ economic policy should be coordinated. Th e dual pur-
pose of diplomacy is therefore not indicative, necessarily, of any form of uniﬁ ca-
tion of positions. Being prepared to accept the principles of supranationality and 
community; see Jeﬀ rey T. Checkel, ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework’, International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 801-826.
27) Leon N. Lindberg, ‘Th e Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration’, in Mette Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 127. 
See also Ben Rosamond, ‘Th e Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neo-
Functionalism of Ernst B. Haas’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005, pp. 237-254. 
28) Th omas Banchoﬀ , Th e German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-
1995, (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
29) Banchoﬀ , Th e German Problem Transformed, p. 22.
30) Jeannette Mak, ‘Informality as an Asset? Th e Case of EMU’, in Th omas Christiansen and Simona 
Piattoni (eds), Informal Governance in the European Union (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), p. 205.
31) Richard K. Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer, ‘Identity and Institutions: Becoming European in the 
EU’, in Richard K. Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities: Becoming European 
in the EU (New York: Rowman & Littleﬁ eld, 2004), p. 12.
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economic integration and to work eﬀ ectively together is not the same as losing 
sight of national interests. While national oﬃ  cials assume that legitimate author-
ity stems from non-elected supranational bodies such as the Commission as well 
as state-based elected and non-elected representatives, this does not mean that 
their loyalty to the common endeavour is a zero-sum game. Rather, it reﬂ ects a 
more pragmatic and experienced idea that one is inﬂ uential if one can come up 
with common solutions.32
Importantly, socialization not only occurs among oﬃ  cials in supranational 
bodies such as the European Commission but in the Council system as well, 
where national representatives adopt norms and rules of appropriateness.33 Nego-
tiations in the inter-governmental Council are far more institutionalized (both 
formally and informally) than, for instance, negotiations in the United Nations.34 
All of the member states have a permanent EU representation in Brussels to rep-
resent their interests, and ministers and diplomats know each other much more 
than they did when the integration process began in the 1950s and 1960s.
Negotiations in Brussels produce a cohort of oﬃ  cials in each member state, 
notably those who have worked in the permanent representations and the Coun-
cil working parties. Th ey are spread throughout the national administrations in 
the ministries of ﬁ nance, agriculture, foreign policy, defence, justice and home 
aﬀ airs, etc. Th is small elite of oﬃ  cials promotes national preferences but is also 
committed to the collective outcomes. Th ey see themselves as working both for 
Europe and for their country and usually do not see any contradiction between 
the two, thus merging functional and territorial principles in their daily work. As 
Brian Hocking notes, the diplomat in Europe is no longer a gatekeeper between 
the inside and outside of the state; rather, he or she is a boundary-spanner in a 
complex, transnational space.35
Along these lines, it has been argued that the European diplomatic service 
constitutes ‘an epistemic community of experts who often exercise their own 
agency separate from member state preferences’.36 Th is analysis implies, however, 
that member state preferences are generated domestically and subsequently repre-
sented in Brussels. Th e argument rests on an assumption of the decoupling of 
national preference formation and subsequent negotiations in the Council. Th e 
‘real’ national preferences are not ‘respected’, so as to speak. However, this inter-
pretation essentially builds upon a distinction between what is national and what 
32) Jeﬀ rey Lewis, ‘Th e Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision-Making in the Euro-
pean Union’, International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 937-971.
33) Laﬀ an, ‘Th e Social Psychology of Identity Change’, pp. 87-88. See also Lewis, ‘Th e Janus Face of 
Brussels’; and Checkel, ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe’.
34) Bátora, ‘Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?’, p. 56.
35) Hocking, ‘Introduction’.
36) Mai’a Keapuolani Davis Cross, ‘A European Epistemic Community of Diplomats’, in Paul Sharp and 
Geoﬀ rey Wiseman, Th e Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society (New York: Palgrave, 
2007), pp. 224-225.
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is European and thus fails to grasp fully the character of late sovereign diplomacy. 
Its most signiﬁ cant feature is not the gap between the national and international 
scenes (this is hardly a new phenomenon in diplomatic practice, after all); rather, 
the crucial diﬀ erence compared to two-level game diplomacy is that the very 
construction of a national position takes place as part of a struggle for distinction 
and dominance in a ﬁ eld where the stakes have already been deﬁ ned.
Delocalization of the National Interest
A third feature of late sovereignty in the EU is the delocalization of national 
interest. National interest is deﬁ ned in Brussels just as much as it is in Berlin, 
Ljubljana or Madrid. Th e diplomats’ understanding of the objective of their 
negotiations is pieced together not only by their ministries and parliament back 
home, but just as much by their European colleagues. Th e physical displacement 
of diplomats in the Permanent Representations reﬂ ects an ideational shift, in the 
sense that the national interest is produced in a transnational ﬁ eld among oﬃ  cials 
sharing a Europeanized habitus or sens pratique.37 Diplomacy in the EU cannot 
simply be described as mediation between the domestic and European levels.
To examine how the construction of national interest has been detached from 
domestic institutions, it is useful to examine how national negotiation positions 
are established in practice. In order to be able to play its role as ‘guardian of the 
treaties’ and ‘defender of the general interest’, the Commission has been given 
the right of initiative, which empowers and requires it to make proposals on the 
matters contained in the treaty, either because the treaty expressly so provides or 
because the Commission considers it necessary. Th is power of initiative is exclu-
sive in respect of Community matters, the principle being that the Council makes 
decisions only ‘on a proposal from the Commission’, so that there is a coherent 
framework for all initiatives. In the case of the second (common foreign and 
security policy) and third (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) 
pillars, this right of initiative is shared by the Commission and the member states, 
and unanimity in the Council is generally necessary, although almost all legisla-
tion will be adopted though the community method with the Lisbon Treaty.
Because the initiative generally rests with the Commission, a national position 
must be expressed in the form of a contribution — positive or negative — to the 
Commission’s proposals. Th is is essentially a reactive performance. It is well 
known that the Commission is in close contact with the capitals before it pro-
poses new legislation to ensure that it goes down well, but it is the member states 
closest to the Commission’s pro-integrationist position that emerge as ‘winners’ in 
37) Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Th e Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Inte-
gration Strategies’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 46, no, 3, 2008, pp. 663-684.
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the negotiations.38 National diplomats can play a proactive role by lobbying the 
Commission, European Parliament and the other member states before proposals 
for new legislation or decisions are formally put on the negotiation table. For 
more EU-sceptical countries, this situation requires much work. As former UK 
ambassador to the EU Stephen Wall writes:
Th e amount of eﬀ ort which the UK Representation in Brussels puts into keeping alongside the 
Commission and the EP [European Parliament] certainly exceeds that of most other member 
governments.39
Th e general picture of EU decision-making is thus that the Commission proposes 
new legislation, which the Council then takes over and modiﬁ es, together with 
the European Parliament, before it becomes binding.40
In this process, where the national interest is delocalized, national representa-
tives assume the role of technocrats participating in the construction of a non-
state polity. Th is becomes evident if one considers the level of speciﬁ cation in 
new EU legislation, which has reached a point comparable to national law. Legal 
instruments such as the Directive 2001/43/EC relating to ‘tyres for motor vehi-
cles and their trailers and to their ﬁ tting’ and Directive 2004/24/EC on ‘tradi-
tional herbal medicinal products’ are negotiated in the Council system, but they 
have very little to do with defeat or victory for the nation; rather, to paraphrase 
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, they relate more to the 
creation of a ‘Europe of results’. In the late sovereign order with overlapping com-
petences, the ultimate purpose of diplomacy is not merely to mediate between 
states and promote national interests in a peaceful manner, but also to solve com-
mon problems in a legally and politically constraining polity.
However, there is a catch to this argument. One could argue that being dual-
purposed is a general feature of all diplomacy, in the sense that diplomacy func-
tions as a means of conserving a particular, often peaceful, order.41 While the 
polity-building agenda may thus sound radical, it is in fact merely a reﬂ exion of 
38) Stephanie Bailer, ‘Bargaining Success in the European Union: Th e Impact of Exogenous and Endog-
enous Power Resources’, European Union Politics vol. 5, no, 1, 2004, pp. 99-123.
39) Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Th atcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), p. 202.
40) After preparation in COREPER, proposals enter Council deliberations labelled either as ‘A-points’ or 
‘B-points’. A-points are decisions that have already been made by COREPER and are therefore accepted 
without discussion in the Council. B-points are proposals on which the COREPER could not agree and 
thus need to be discussed and possibly voted upon by the ministers. Empirical studies show that up to 90 
per cent of Council decisions are A-points. See Jeﬀ rey Lewis ‘Institutional Environments and Everyday 
EU Decision-Making: Rationalist or Constructivist?’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 1, Febru-
ary 2003, pp. 97-124.
41) According to Mayall, the underlying rationale of the diplomatic profession is to facilitate orderly and 
peaceful relations among states; see James Mayall, ‘Introduction’, in Paul Sharp and George Wiseman 
(eds), Th e Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), p. 6.
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what Neumann refers to as the general trick to being a diplomat, namely ‘[. . .] to 
concentrate on the here and now, on keeping the wheels turning’.42 Keeping the 
wheels turning in the EU, however, goes beyond safeguarding an existing order; 
it necessarily also involves participating in the construction of new policies.
In sum, diplomacy in the EU remains centred on representing the interests of 
the member states against other member states in the Council of Ministers, which 
is where we observe continuation. However, the actual formulation of the national 
interest proceeds within a diplomatic space in Brussels, which is focused on con-
structing a European polity that limits the sovereignty of its member states. Mem-
ber state representatives may continue to think in terms of national interest, but 
they do so in ways that are diﬀ erent from 50 years ago.
Speaking With One Voice
Nevertheless, there is deﬁ nitely a new trend in the EU that appears to point in the 
opposite direction, namely the shift away from supranationalism towards deci-
sion-making that is dominated by the European Council — that is, the heads of 
state and government. Th e growing number of bilateral meetings and summits 
between EU member states’ political leaders could be viewed as a return to classi-
cal diplomacy between sovereigns.43 When the heads of state reach agreement 
among themselves, they are often far removed from the supranationalism of the 
community method. I would argue, however, that this is not a return to the good 
old days of sovereign diplomacy, but part of the trend where ‘Europe speaks with 
one voice’.
Th e recent ﬁ nancial crisis oﬀ ers a case in point. At the extraordinary summit 
on 12 October 2008 between the heads of state from the euro area and the United 
Kingdom, the result initially appears to be the prevalence of national solutions. 
French President Sarkozy’s original idea of a common European bank bailout 
fund was dropped in the face of German resistance to being seen as paying for 
others. Th e current rescue plans may have been coordinated, but the details are 
being decided by individual national governments, and no money is being pooled. 
In other words, Sarkozy’s satisfaction with the summit at the subsequent press 
conference was a mere cover for diﬀ erent national policies with beggar-thy-neigh-
bour consequences to which a pan-European agreement was tacked.
Nonetheless, it is premature to interpret this as a ‘renationalization’ of Euro-
pean integration because it would be erroneous to see the increasing number of 
high-level summits as merely aiming at producing concrete decisions. Th e sum-
mits are part of a larger transformation of how ‘good statesmanship’ is perceived 
42) Iver B. Neumann, ‘To Be a Diplomat’, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1, 2005, pp. 72-93.
43) See Josef Janning, ‘Leadership Coalitions and Change: Th e Role of States in the European Union’, 
International Aﬀ airs, vol. 81, vol. 4, pp. 821-831.
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in contemporary Europe. At the press conference, Sarkozy expressed satisfaction 
with the negotiations, underlining that they reﬂ ected a concerted approach and 
that he wanted ‘Europe to speak with one voice’. In fact, Sarkozy was standing 
next to Commission President Barroso, who also issued assurances to journalists 
regarding European unity. Th e many attempts to ‘speak with one voice’ should be 
analysed as an eﬀ ort to disseminate normative and cognitive frameworks, not just 
as covering hard bargains. Th e very idea that ‘we are doing something together’ 
was an important message at the press conference. Hence, the myth of a uniﬁ ed 
Europe is reproduced at EU summits as the depoliticized results of consensus 
among member states.
From this perspective, Sarkozy’s ‘Euro-speak’ assumes a language that ‘works to 
connect those inside the institutions [. . .] and, simultaneously, to exclude and set 
apart those who are outside it’.44 Strengthening the European Council can be seen 
as a governmental technique, which — just as the foreign and security policy — is 
driven and legitimized as much by attempts to overcome national diﬀ erences and 
unite as it is about actually playing a role in the world.45 Diplomatic success today 
is largely measured in terms of the ability to ﬁ nd a common position and to make 
Europe speak with one voice. How that voice should sound is less important.
Tempering Transformation
Will the EU’s claims to supreme legal authority and limits on national sover-
eignty mean a goodbye to diplomacy as we know it? At a time when the newly 
appointed British defence secretary, John Hutton, has accepted the establishment 
of a permanent EU army, it seems fair to raise some fundamental questions: If the 
legalization and socialization processes continue in Europe, what remains of inde-
pendent national diplomacy? If the EU speaks with one voice, what happens 
to the national voices? When attempting to imagine what may follow late sover-
eignty, one must ask the fundamental question of how a global order can be 
conceived without representatives of separate political polities.46 Not only has the 
context in which diplomacy takes place changed, but the very meaning of diplo-
macy also seems to be shifting in Brussels. Together with the supranational insti-
tutions, national representatives are participating in the creation of a common 
European language that shapes their understanding of the negotiations.
44) Annica Kronsell, ‘Gender, Power and European Integration Th eory’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 12, no. 6, 2005, p. 1034.
45) See also Christopher J. Bickerton, ‘Th e Perils of Performance: Legitimization in EU Foreign Policy’, 
Perspectives: Th e Central European Review of International Aﬀ airs, vol. 28, 2007, p. 37.
46) See also Walker, ‘Th e Variety of Sovereignty’, in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Th omas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (eds.), Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalizing State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2008), pp. 21-32 at p. 31.
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It is important, however, to moderate the claims of a transformative nature of 
intra-EU diplomacy. One should refrain from assuming that these trends repre-
sent the terminal phase of diplomacy in Europe, because late sovereign diplomacy 
also has inbuilt conservative features. Th ere are at least two reasons for tempering 
the idea that late sovereign diplomacy will transform diplomacy fundamentally. 
First, the doxa of integration is intrinsically ambiguous. Th e fundamental idea 
behind the EU is that it should never reach the crucial point where the state is no 
longer diﬀ erent from another state; when it can no longer make sovereignty claims 
to supreme and ultimate authority over its territory. Should that happen, the 
diplomatic task of moving Europe forwards would no longer be meaningful. Of 
course, national representatives must accept that other states and entities make 
competing and sometimes more successful claims to sovereignty — this is a criti-
cal element in late sovereign diplomacy. However, there must be no clear end-
point of integration.47 Th is is the paradox of European integration. Th e notion of 
an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ requires that one can still 
speak of separate ‘peoples’ and hence that the EU should remain a polity with 
separate and sovereign states.48 An increasing number of areas may become supra-
national and integration may become so overwhelming that the state has essen-
tially lost all autonomy, but as long as state representatives can continue to make 
eﬀ ective calls for sovereignty and the ﬁ nalité debate remains abstract, late sover-
eign diplomacy will have a long shelf-life.
Should national representatives forget about this self-limitation clause that is 
built into the constitutional structure of the EU, others will remind them that 
their transcendental project is fragile, because it is only fully shared by a small 
European elite. In light of the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 and the subsequent negative Irish vote on the Lisbon Treaty in 
2008, objections to the EU orthodoxy are likely to become more prominent in 
the coming years. Th e doxa of ‘an ever closer union’ will be challenged by calls for 
increased diﬀ erentiation in the form of national opt-outs and exemptions. Th e 
Polish declaration to the Charter on Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty 
represents an EU-sceptic view, which was previously only rarely  framed among 
the political and diplomatic elite. New generations of heads of state and govern-
ment and their national representatives will enter the European scene with a dif-
ferent understanding of the purpose of European diplomacy, thereby strengthening 
sovereign diplomacy vis-à-vis the orthodox integration mode. Future enlargement 
rounds may also question the existing doxa, although it has been demonstrated that 
47) Dario Castiglione, ‘Reﬂ ections on Europe’s Constitutional Future’, Constellations, vol. 11, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 393-411; Marlene Wind, ‘Th e European Union as a Polycentric Polity: Returning to a Neo-
Medieval Europe?’, in J.H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
48) J.H.H. Joseph, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’, in Weiler and 
Wind (eds), Constitutionalism beyond the State, p. 10.
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the national representatives from the new member states adapt quickly to the 
informal norms of the Council system.49
Controlling Late Sovereign Diplomacy
Negotiations in the EU are centred on representing the interests of the member 
states against other member states, but the actual handling of the national 
interest — understood as a negotiating position — takes place within a transna-
tional diplomatic ﬁ eld in Brussels that is focused on constructing a European 
polity. National interest does not disappear in the EU, but it is far less socially 
mediated than most accounts of the EU and Council negotiations are inclined 
to believe.
A critique of this development would begin by arguing that this brings us back 
to earlier forms of realpolitik, where actions were more those of individual leaders 
and their advisers than those of nations or people. Interests, yes — but not 
‘national’ as such. In this view, national positions in the EU do not always have 
the strength and absoluteness of interests with the weight of society behind them. 
Stated more radically:
We see that sovereignty, as the forceful assertion of national interests and ambitions, is less appropri-
ate to the actual behaviour of today’s elites. On the contrary, European integration begins to look 
somewhat like Althusser’s ‘process without a subject’. Sovereignty survives as performance, but its 
content is attenuated.50
Heartﬁ eld’s argument points out the naivety of the two-level game assumption, 
which supposes a much stronger and more direct link between national prefer-
ence formation (whatever that may be taken to mean) and Council negotiations. 
However, the problem with Heartﬁ eld’s argument is that it assumes that sover-
eignty was once a ‘forceful assertion of national interests and ambitions’. In point-
ing out the links between late sovereignty order and a small diplomatic elite in 
the EU engine room, one should avoid falling into the opposite trap of essential-
izing the national interest as having a particular ‘vitality’. National representatives 
who develop policy within Brussels share many assumptions and inhabit the same 
world, but so did the aristocratic diplomats of 1850. Rather, the polity-building 
agenda of European integration suggests that EU diplomacy goes beyond an 
49) Jacob Lempp and Janko Altenschmidt, ‘Th e Prevention of Deadlock through Informal Processes of 
“Supranationalization”: Th e Case of COREPER’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 30, no. 4, 2008, 
pp. 511-526.
50) James Heartﬁ eld, ‘European Union: A Process Without a Subject’, in Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip 
Cunliﬀ e and Alexander Gourevitch (eds), Politics Without Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary Inter-
national Relations (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 147.
138 R. Adler-Nissen / Th e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 4 (2009) 121-141
intense integration of the diplomatic elite’s worldviews; it points out problems of 
accountability.
Some years ago, Allot predicted that democracy would replace intra-European 
diplomacy.51 Th is ‘replacement’ has yet to be seen. When national interests are 
Europeanized, it is once again germane to raise the fundamental questions of why 
we have diplomacy and for whom diplomacy works.52 In this respect, there are at 
least two reﬂ ections that merit consideration. One approach is to call for a return 
to ‘sovereign diplomacy’; another is to assume the transition to late sovereignty 
and to ‘go democratic’. Sharp advocates the former. To avoid becoming a source 
of international tension:
[D]iplomats should remind themselves and others that they are ﬁ rst and foremost the representa-
tives of sovereign states, that this is their raison d’être and a precondition for anything else they may 
aspire to be or do.53
In the current multi-dimensional European order, however, the raison d’être of 
national diplomacy has changed, perhaps for good. Indeed, European integration 
would not have been possible had this not been the case. Th us, while Sharp’s 
comment is a valuable reminder, it will not be able to match the EU’s overlapping 
authority structures and the supranational decision-making process.
An alternative route to thinking about how to make diplomacy in the EU 
more accountable assumes that we have entered a late sovereign order for good. 
According to this view, the challenge is not to roll back integration, but to intro-
duce new checks and processes that will supposedly increase its accountability.54 
We are likely to see greater parliamentary control, both on the national and 
European scenes. Stronger involvement by national parliaments in the decision-
making process will possibly link national representative practices more directly 
to the debates in national capitals and give rise to demands that the bargains in 
Brussels reﬂ ect particular national problems. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether 
initiatives such as giving national parliaments the power to block new legislation 
through the use of ‘red cards’ will change how late sovereign diplomacy functions. 
Rather, they may have the opposite eﬀ ect in terms of increased frustration, both 
for diplomats and the populations that they represent.55
51) Allot, quoted in Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘Modern European Diplomacy: A Research Agenda’, Journal 
of International Relations and Development , vol. 2, no. 1, 1999, p. 86.
52) Late sovereign diplomacy is linked to the reﬂ exion or self-confrontation, which is characteristic of 
late modernity; see Ulrich Beck, Th e Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Th eory of Reﬂ exive Modernization 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
53) Paul Sharp, ‘Who Needs Diplomats? Th e Problem of Diplomatic Representation’, in Christer Jönsson 
and Richard Langhorne (eds), Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy, Volume III (London: Sage, 
2004), p. 76.
54) See Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why Th ere Is a Democratic Deﬁ cit in the EU: A Response to 
Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, 2006, pp. 533-562.
55) See also Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Th e Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union’, Th e Modern Law 
Review, vol. 59, no. 3, 1996, pp. 349-376.
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Based on the above, I would argue that any new institutional mechanism 
created to install external controls will be interpreted and reinterpreted by 
diplomats assuming that legitimate authority not only stems from state-based 
elected and non-elected representatives, but also from non-elected supranational 
bodies. Whether or not reproducing national systems of ‘accountability’ and 
‘representation’ — in a system in which national representation serves both 
national and European agendas  — will have the desired eﬀ ect ought to be explored 
further in empirical analyses. But creating fundamental changes in the way that 
states negotiate in the European Union would require radical reforms, not only to 
the institutional set-up, but also to the diplomatic identities, social hierarchies 
and the sense of purpose of the integration process.
Beyond the European Union?
One could speculate that the EU’s polity-building agenda is a more general fea-
ture of contemporary diplomacy. As Paul Sharp notes in a critique of post-Cold 
War diplomacy:
Representation — of sovereigns, interests, or ideas — was replaced by metaphors of constructing 
and building by which issues were to be managed and problems were to be solved.56
According to Sharp, the modern diplomat moves away from representing the 
notion of a sovereign state towards engineering new international institutions. 
Yet, one should carefully specify the area of validity. It seems obvious that a sys-
tems-wide phenomenon such as diplomacy may not be directly aﬀ ected by what 
goes on between one of the system’s units — that is, the EU. Th is is not to say that 
diplomacy is not changing on a global level, but this debate must be studied at 
the level of the global system, for example as a result of globalization processes.57
One might instead ask whether there are other international organizations 
with dynamics that are similar to those identiﬁ ed above. Outside Europe, it is 
more diﬃ  cult to identify the same degree of integration between national repre-
sentatives that we ﬁ nd in the European Union. Trade organizations such as the 
WTO and regional organizations such as the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and Mercosur (from the Spanish Mercado Común del Sur) 
could be possible and interesting comparisons. Contrary to the EU, however, 
these organizations are inter-governmental in nature.58
56) Sharp, ‘Who Needs Diplomats?’, p. 67.
57) See Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley (eds), Global Governance and Diplomacy: 
Worlds Apart? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
58) Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in South-East Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001); and Andre Malamud, ‘Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising 
Rhetoric and Declining Achievement’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀ airs, vol. 18, no. 3, 2005, 
pp. 421-436.
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Although the WTO lacks fundamental elements of supranational law — such 
as superiority and direct eﬀ ect — it is ‘functionally equivalent to supranational 
law’ and has become a further layer of governance.59 However, the WTO is short 
of some of the features that render European diplomacy late sovereign: the WTO 
reaches decisions by consensus among some 150 member states; there are no 
supranational institutions participating in the negotiations; and more crucially, 
the WTO does not have a polity-building agenda. Indeed, the key to understand-
ing diplomacy in the European Union is the unprecedented nature of the EU 
itself and the novel role that national oﬃ  cials play in representing member states 
while making decisions in the name of a supranational authority.
Conclusion
Th is article has argued that national representatives have contributed to a silent 
transformation of diplomacy in Europe during the last 50 years. Neither the two-
level game metaphor of liberal inter-governmentalism nor the territorial logic of 
multi-level governance oﬀ er adequate accounts of the diplomatic practices within 
the EU. In many instances, the national interest is no longer framed as the state’s 
interests for itself, but as the state’s ambitions for the EU. When defending posi-
tions in the Council, national representatives participate actively in the construc-
tion of a late sovereign order. Within the EU diplomatic interaction does not 
merely involve sovereign states speaking with each other; rather, political and 
legal authorities overlap, territorial exclusivity is replaced with functional divi-
sions of powers, and states begin to speak with one voice.
Th ere are at least three distinct — although interrelated — features of late 
sovereign diplomacy in the European Union: the purpose of diplomacy is not 
merely mediation between states, but the creation of ‘an ever closer union’; 
national representatives are undergoing intense socialization; and the national 
interest is delocalized. While socialization may be seen as a return to the ‘good old 
days’ of intimate European aristocracy, teleological and delocalized diplomatic 
practices could be a novelty because the diplomat is not only a mediator but also 
a constructor of a non-state polity that rivals the state. Beyond Europe, however, 
it is more diﬃ  cult to identify the same dynamics that characterize the late sover-
eignty phase of diplomacy.
Moreover, conventional and transcendental dynamics are not mutually exclu-
sive. Th e coexistence of ideas of traditional national interests and a common 
European interest is at the core of diplomatic practices in the late sovereign phase. 
Sovereign statehood survives in the minds and practices of those that represent 
59) Markus Krajewski, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law’, Journal of 
World Trade, vol. 35, no. 1. 2001, p. 171.
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the state in Europe.60 Th is simultaneousness is also what creates the many ten-
sions in late sovereign diplomacy. Because the doxa of ‘an ever closer Union’ is 
fundamentally ambivalent, the late sovereign phase will likely be lengthy.
Th e late sovereign phase of diplomacy raises fundamental questions about 
accountability in a multi-dimensional order with its constitutional pluralism and 
an uneasy combination of ‘national’ and ‘common’ interest. Any genuine and 
lasting EU reform must consider that national diplomacy in the EU is no longer 
what it used to be.
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